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I. INTRODUCTION
According to the classical understanding of how patents work, a
FRPSDQ\WDNHVHDFKRILWVSDWHQWVVHHVLILWUHDGVRQWRWKHFRPSHWLWRU¶V
product and, if it does, either commences negotiations to establish
royalty payments or files patent litigation to claim the appropriate
damages, royalties, or injunction. 1 Similarly, as a new product is
developed, the company examines the universe of relevant granted
patents to make certain that no infringement will be triggered by the
new product.2 If a covering patent is found, the company²at least if it
LVD³JRRG´DFWRU²will attempt to negotiate a license to use the patented
technology and, if that fails, either design the new product around the
patent so that infringement will be avoided 3 or abandon the product
development effort.4
The idealized model described above does not match the reality of
the modern patent system, as a focused examination of a product in
comparison to the relevant universe of patents is much less likely to
occur now than in the past. 5 This article examines this disconnect
between the reality of how patents are being used today and the
underlying principal of patent law that a monopoly is granted in

1
See Tom Harris, How Patents Work, HOWSTUFFWORKS,
http://money.howstuffworks.com/patent.htm (last visited Mar. 7, 2016); Jim
Anderson, Why IT Managers Need to Know About How Patents Work, THE
ACCIDENTAL IT LEADER (Jan. 15, 2015),
http://theaccidentalitleader.com/innovation-2/why-it-managers-need-to-know-abouthow-patents-work.; WORLD INTELLECTUAL PROP. ORG., Frequently Asked
Questions: Patents, http://www.wipo.int/patents/en/faq_patents.html (last visited
Mar. 7, 2016); Christopher A. Cotropia, Patent Claim Interpretation Methodologies
and Their Claim Scope Paradigms, 47 WM. & MARY L. REV. 49, 61±69 (2005)
(describing how patent claims serve to inform others about the scope of the invention
made). To clarify the discussion, this article will describe the problems being
addressed using the language of product patents. The issues being discussed are
equally apropos to process patents, however, so the discussion of product patents is
not meant to exclude process patents.
2
See DAVID A. BURGE, PATENT & TRADEMARK TACTICS & PRACTICE 102±05
(3d ed. 1999). But see Sean B. Seymore, The Teaching Function of Patents, 85
NOTRE DAME L. REV. 621, 637 (2010) (criticizing many current patents for failing to
clearly describe the invention made).
3
See, e.g.,State Indus. Inc. v. A.O. Smith Corp., 751 F.2d 1226, 1235±36 (Fed.
&LU  DFNQRZOHGJLQJWKDW³µGHVLJQ>LQJ@DURXQG¶DFRPSHWLWRU¶VSURGXFW´LVSDUW
of the patent system).
4
Julie Bennett, From Idea to Market, ENTREPRENEUR (Sept. 20, 2010),
http://www.entrepreneur.com/article/217332 (advising those who find an existing
SDWHQWIRUWKHLUSURGXFWWR³VWRSULJKWWKHUH´LQVWHDGRIIXQGLQJSURGXFWGHYHORSPHQW
for a product that already exists).
5
See infra Part II.
continued . . .
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exchange for the disclosure of new technologies.6 Specifically, it will
address two problems that plague the current patent system: 7 the use of
³KD\VWDFN´ SDWHQW SRUWIROLRV UDWKHU WKDQ LQGLYLGXDO SDWHQWV DQG WKH
overwhelming abundance of newly issued patents.8
A possible solution to these problems is proposed in the form of a
compulsory licensing system for most patents. This solution is
described as a method of identifying the types of changes that would be
needed to overcome the problems and not with an expectation that it
could be adopted easily 9 or that it would not raise issues within
international norms.10
II. THE CURRENT PATENT SYSTEM AS A MARKET FAILURE FOR A
MAJORITY OF ISSUED PATENTS
A. 3DWHQW3RUWIROLRVDV³+D\VWDFNV´
Recently, a practicing patent attorney11 used an interesting analogy
fRUKRZKHXVHVKLVFRPSDQ\¶VSDWHQWSRUWIROLRZKHQHLWKHUQHJRWLDWLQJ
6

See Ralph D. Clifford, Thomas G. Field, Jr. & Jon R. Cavicchi, A Statistical
Analysis of the Patent Bar: Where Are the Software-Savvy Patent Attorneys?, 11
N.C. J. LAW & TECH. 223, 224±26 (2010).
7
Id. at 224±26 nn.4±7.
8
Id.
9
It is highly unlikely that the current Congress would be receptive to the
proposal as the countervailing policies that need to be balanced in a patent provision
appear to freeze Congress in place. Cf. Tom Risen, Congress, Silicon Valley Spar on
Tackling Patent Trolls, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP. (July 14, 2015 6:49 PM),
http://www.usnews.com/news/articles/2015/07/14/congress-silcon-valley-spar-onhow-to-tackle-patent-trolls.
10
It is not clear that compulsory licenses would comply with the obligation
under existing treaty obligations to make patent rights enforceable. See Agreement
on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS), art. 28(1)(a), Apr.
15, 1994, 1867 U.N.T.S. 154, available at
http://www.wto.org/english/docs_e/legal_e/27-trips_01_e.htm ³>:@KHUHWKHVXEMHFW
PDWWHURIDSDWHQWLVDSURGXFWWRSUHYHQWWKLUGSDUWLHVQRWKDYLQJWKHRZQHU¶V
consent from the acts of: making, using, offering for sale, selling, or importing (6)
IRUWKHVHSXUSRVHVWKDWSURGXFW´ ,WLVDQRSHQTXHstion whether the compulsory
OLFHQVHVGHVFULEHGLQWKLVDUWLFOHFDQVHUYHDV³RZQHU¶VFRQVHQW´ In any case, the
legally binding nature of the treaty is far from clear. See 19 U.S.C. § 3512 (2012)
³1RSURYLVLRQRIDQ\RIWKH8UXJXD\5RXQG$JUHHPHQWVQRUthe application of any
such provision to any person or circumstance, that is inconsistent with any law of the
8QLWHG6WDWHVVKDOOKDYHHIIHFW´ . See also David A. Gantz, A Post-Uruguay Round
Introduction to International Trade Law in the United States, 12 ARIZ. J. INT'L &
COMP. L. 1, 9 (1995).
11
The attorney works as in-house patent counsel for a large computer firm. As
WKHWDONKHJDYHZDVQRWDSXEOLFSUHVHQWDWLRQKLVDQGKLVFRPSDQ\¶VDQRQ\PLW\LV
preserved.
continued . . .
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or litigating against a competing firm. He constantly referred to his
FRPSDQ\¶VSDWHQWSRUWIROLRDVD³KD\VWDFN´$VKLVWDONGHYHORSHGLW
became clear that analogy was quite apt, but was not the one that
LPPHGLDWHO\VSUXQJWRPLQG7\SLFDOO\D³KD\VWDFN´LVDUHIHUHQFHWR
WKHSURYHUELDO³QHHGOHLQDKD\VWDFN´12 On first impression, one could
assume that his work for his company involved finding the patent needle
within the haystack RIKLVILUP¶VWKRXVDQGVRISDWHQWV+HVRRQPDGHLW
clear, however, that this is not what he meant.
Much of the licensing work that he was doing had nothing to do with
an identified technological product that read on to an identified patent;13
instead, with the WHQV RI WKRXVDQGV RI SDWHQWV LQ HDFK FRPSDQ\¶V
portfolio, the odds were high that at least some of them would be
relevant. In other words, both companies now assume that the needle
patent²one that actually does read onto the technology²is in the
portfolio somewhere but, like the needle in the haystack, no one has the
time or interest to actually read the patents and find the relevant sharp.
Thus, he stated, it is not important to have an identified patent that
UHDGV RQWR WKH FRPSHWLWRU¶V SURGXFW UDther, it is important to have a
haystack of patents that is so large that no competitor would ever have
the time to sort through the haystack to find out if the needle is actually
there. 14 The threat of using the haystack was enough, as a practical
matter, to force the surrender of the competitor because its size would
present an overwhelming burden of comprehension (and expense, if
litigation occurs).15 Under the haystack theory, a thousand patents²
even if all of them are likely to be found invalid if challenged in court²
is better than one good one.16 No one, after all, can afford to challenge
a thousand patents,17 but may easily be able to fund the challenge of
12

See ERIC PARTRIDGE, A DICTIONARY OF CLICHÉS 151 (Dutton Paperback ed.,

1963).
13

³5HDGLQJRQ´LVWKHWHUPRIDUWIRUWKHSURFHVVRIFRPSDULQJWKHFODLPVLQD
patent to an allegedly infringing device as, in most cases, if there is an identity
between the claims and the device, infringement has occurred. See, e.g., Rice v.
Schutte, 38 App. D.C. 175, 177±78 (D.C. Cir. 1912).
14
See Justin R. Orr, Note, Patent Aggregation: Models, Harms, and the Limited
Role of Antitrust, 28 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 525, 526 (2013) (discussing aggregating
weak patents into portfolios as a market tactic). As a practical matter, there are likely
to be relevant patents to any product if a company owns thousands of patents within
the same art. Cf. id.
15
Id.
16
See, e.g., Malcom Gladwell, 1,+0D\6HHNWR9RLG)LUP¶V3DWLHQWRQ$=7,
WASH. POST, May 29, 1991, available at
https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/politics/1991/05/29/nih-may-seek-to-voidfirms-patent-on-azt/3270d0fa-55d7-4995-af2b-293db96a4fff/.
17
According to a survey conducted by the American Intellectual Property Law
Association in 2013, the cost to defend a patent suit runs from an average of
continued . . .
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Of course, the patent law definitional model established in the
United States is built on the use of needles, not haystacks.18 Although
some modifications to the litigation system may encourage a partial
return to a needle over a haystack design parameter within the patent
system, 19 more systematic change appears necessary to make this
universal.
B. More Than a Quarter of a Million New Patents a Year
The patent system is dependent on its users understanding the entire
portfolio of patented technology within the relevant area as well as
absorbing advancing technology once it is disclosed in newly granted
patents.20 Any company that is developing a new product is expected,
after all, to design it in a way that does not infringe existing or newly
issued patents.21 A failure to meet this requirement results in liability
for infringement.22 Consequently, to protect a company against suit, its
patent attorneys must appreciate the entire set of existing patents and
must keep abreast of newly issued ones. 23 The reality today, however,
is that both of these tasks are practical impossibilities.24
Currently, there are an estimated 3 million active utility patents,25
$516,000 if the claim is less than $1,000,000 and the action ends at the discovery
phase to a mean of $2,671,000 if the claim is more than $10,000,000 and the action
requires a full litigation on the merits. AILPA, Rpt. of the Econ. Survey 2013 at I145±46; see also Brief for Amicus Curiae Computer & Communications Industry
$VV¶QLQ6XSSRUWRI3HWLWLRQHUDW, WildTangent, Inc. v. Ultramercial, LLC, 134 S.
Ct. 2870 (2014) (No. 13-255), 2013 WL 5372423, at *11.
18
See, e.g., John Raidt, Patents and Biotechnology, U.S. CHAMBER OF COMM.
FOUND., https://www.uschamberfoundation.org/patents-and-biotechnology (last
visited Mar. 7, 2016) (discussing one of the challenges to patenting in the
biotechnology industry is excessive litigation).
19
See Dennis Crouch, Patent Reform: Innovation Act of 2015, PATENTLYO
(Feb. 15, 2015), http://patentlyo.com/patent/2015/02/patent-reform-innovation.html
(describing litigation reforms in the submitted bill).
20
DAVID A. BURGE, PATENT & TRADEMARK TACTICS & PRACTICE 103 (3d ed.
  ³$VSDWHQWVLVVXHWRFRPSHWLWRUVDQGLQWKHVSHFLILFILHOGVRIRQH¶VLQWHUHVWV
you should s\VWHPDWLFDOO\RUGHUDQGUHYLHZFRSLHVRIWKHP´ 
21
See generally Oskar Liivak, Rethinking the Concept of Exclusion in Patent
Law, 98 GEO. L.J. 1643 (2010) (discussing the preemptive effect of the current
patent system and proposing an alternative).
22
See 35 U.S.C. § 271 (2012). Only a limited defense is available to commercial
use of a patent that starts more than a year before the patent application is filed or
disclosed. Id. § 273.
23
See BURGE, supra note 20, at 103.
24
See infra notes 25±31 and accompanying text.
25
See Dennis Crouch, Patent Number Nine Million, PATENTLYO (Apr. 7, 2015),
http://patentlyo.com/patent/2015/04/patent-number-million.html (noting that
continued . . .
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many of which could read onto a new product. This number is not static
as record numbers of new patents are being issued each year.26 In 2013,
nearly 278,000 new utility patents were issued.27 In 2014, the number
of newly issued utility patents increased to over 300,000.28 To process
just these new 300,000 patents, you would need to read and understand
144 of them per business hour for eight hours per day on every business
day²which is the equivalent of reading and understanding a new patent
every twenty-five seconds. 29 Even if a hypothetical patent attorney
could work twenty-four hours a day, seven days a week, more than
thirty-four patents an hour would need to be evaluated.30 Under the best
of circumstances, it takes more than twenty-five seconds (or even two
minutes) to read and understand a patent.
Even if it is assumed that the relevant newly issued patents can be
found, read, and understood at this rate, failure is still probable. No time
is left to review the 3 million patents that have already been issued.
Understanding the technology disclosed in existing and newly issued
patents thus appears to be a Sisyphean burden.31
approximately one-third of the nine million issued utility patents are currently
active).
26
Dennis Crouch, USPTO Grants and Applications Both Down (Slightly) for
FY2015, PATENTLYO (May 26, 2015),
http://patentlyo.com/patent/2015/05/applications-slightly-fy2015.html [hereinafter
Crouch, USPTO Grants]. Some are predicting that 2014 is a peak year in the number
of patents issued. Id. Even if the predicted drop in issued utility patents occurs, it is
expected to be by only 2%, approximately 2,000 fewer patents from a base of over
300,000. Id.
27
U.S. Patent Statistics Chart Calendar Years 1963-2014, U.S. PATENT &
TRADEMARK OFF., http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/ac/ido/oeip/taf/us_stat.htm
(last modified Mar. 9, 2016).
28
Id.
29
This calculation uses the federal definition of a business hour, which
determines that there are 2,087 hours in the average work year. See U.S. OFF. OF
PERSONNEL MGMT., Fact Sheet: Computing Hourly Rates of Pay Using The 2,087Hour Divisor, http://www.opm.gov/policy-data-oversight/pay-leave/payadministration/fact-sheets/computing-hourly-rates-of-pay-using-the-2087-hourdivisor/ (last visited Mar. 7, 2016). The number of hours is based on a forty-hour
work week, and does not include vacation or sick time. Id. Additionally, the formula
determines that there are almost 261 business days in the average year. See id.
Dividing the 300,000 patents by 2,087 gives just under 144 per hour. Looking at
the inverse, this would give someone approximately twenty-five seconds to read and
understand each patent. Since the federal figure excludes things like vacation time,
the task would actually be more difficult than this calculation shows.
30
There are 8,760 clock-hours in a non-leap year (365 days times twenty-four
hours).
31
Sisyphus, a Greek mythological character, was ordered by Hades to
repeatedly roll a heavy boulder up a hill, only to see it roll back down as soon as he
reached the summit³,QPRGHUQXVDJHD6LV\SKHDQWDsk is one that is exhausting,
continued . . .
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Some relief could be had by hiring more patent attorneys to do the
work; after all, if one attorney would have to process 144 patents in an
hour, two would cut than number in half to 72 patents an hour, four to
36 an hour, and so on. Ultimately, however, throwing more bodies at
the problem is also likely destined to fail. 32 As Dr. Brooks
demonstrates, adding labor only shortens complicated tasks somewhat
as additional time will be needed to coordinate the work of the larger
workforce.33 More significantly, extra labor can result in the overall
project failing as the complex interactions involved in the project
become significantly less likely to be detected.34 Although there are
obvious differences between designing large-scale computer systems
and reading and understanding massive numbers of patents,35 both seem
equally technologically complex since neither will succeed in the
absence of complete information flow. The point, after all, is not just
to read patents; LWLVWRUHDGXQGHUVWDQGDQGDSSO\WKHPWRDFRPSDQ\¶V
developing product line, including appreciating how multiple patents
interface with each other.
Another way the above estimates may slightly overstate the problem
is that not all companies are involved in a multitude of industries; 36
indeed, some companies, particularly new start-up companies, may be
involved with a single major project. Even with that limitation,
however, if the company is involved with any leading technology, there
would still be over 5,200 new patents a year to read and absorb on
average.37 This equates with reading and understanding two and a half
XQFHDVLQJDQGXOWLPDWHO\DLPOHVV´LUKE ROMAN & MONICA ROMAN,
ENCYCLOPEDIA OF GREEK AND ROMAN MYTHOLOGY, 443±44 (2010).
32
See FREDERICK P. BROOKS, JR., THE MYTHICAL MAN-MONTH: ESSAYS ON
SOFTWARE ENGINEERING  GHG  ³2YHUVLPplifying outrageously, we state
%URRNV¶V/DZAdding manpower to a late software project makes it later.´
(emphasis added). Similarly, throwing more patent attorneys at the problem of
reading and understanding patents could result in a greater amount of work. See id.
at 13±19.
33
See id. DW ³,QWDVNVWKDWFDQEHSDUWLWLRQHGEXWZKLFKUHTXLUH
communication among the subtasks, the effort of communication must be added to
WKHDPRXQWRIZRUNWREHGRQH´ 
34
See id. at 18±19, 212.
35
See id. DWYLL ³,QPDny ways, managing a large computer programming
project is like managing any other large undertaking²in more ways than most
SURJUDPPHUVEHOLHYH´ 
36
But see All Products, GEN. ELEC. CORP., http://www.ge.com/products (last
visited Mar. 7, 2016) (describing twenty-six product categories); Products for
Business and Consumers, 3M CORP., http://www.3m.com/3M/en_US/company-us/
(last visited Mar. 7, 2016) (describing thirty-two business and seven consumer
product categories).
37
The average number of new patents issued in 2014 for the fifty most popular
art units was 5,257. See Part II, Patent Counts by Class By Year, U.S. PATENT &
continued . . .
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patents per business hour, every hour, every day. 38 Further, most
products are built from technologies that are protected by more than one
class of patents, which could greatly increase the number of patents that
must be processed and understood.39
C. The Result: Market-Driven Patent System Fails
Consequently, it has become a practical impossibility for a company
to protect itself against infringing patents by a regularized
FRPSUHKHQVLYHUHYLHZRILVVXHGSDWHQWV(YHQWKH³JRRGDFWRUV´LQWKH
marketplace cannot reasonably be expected to know the technology
disclosed in the 3 million active patents, much less keep track of the
new disclosures in the 300,000 annually issued new patents. 40
Unfortunately, the patent system continues to operate with this
expectation. In In re Seagate Technology, LLC, for example, the
Federal Circuit noted that willfulness on the part of an accused infringer
is not needed to establish liability, but it does serve to give the court the
right to enhance damages that are to be paid for the infringement.41 The
determination of willfulness is not simple; indeed, the Federal Circuit
has identified nine factors that are relevant to the determination:
(1) [W]hether the infringer deliberately copied the ideas
or design of another; (2) whether the infringer, when he
knew of the other's patent protection, investigated the
scope of the patent and formed a good-faith belief that it
was invalid or that it was not infringed; (3) the infringer's
behavior as a party to the litigation . . . . (4) [d]efendant's
size and financial condition . . . (5) [c]loseness of the
case . . . (6) [d]uration of defendant's misconduct . . . (7)
[r]emedial action by the defendant . . . (8) [d]efendant's
TRADEMARK OFF.,
http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/ac/ido/oeip/taf/cbcby.htm#PartA2 (last visited
Mar. 7, 2016) [hereinafter USPTO Patent Counts]. If the company were involved
with the most commonly triggered art class²257: active solid-state devices²there
would have been 15,581 patents to digest. Id.
38
5,200 divided by 2,087. For the most popular art class, 257, approximately
seven and a half patents would need to be processed every hour.
39
Consider the television. Its broad art class is 348, the tenth most common
class in 2014. At the same time, seven of the remaining top ten classes could easily
impact the design of a new TV. Only the seventh and eighth categories, drugs (514)
and molecular biology (435), are completely separate from television technology.
Almost 90,000 patents are indexed under the eight TV-relevant classes. See UPSTO
Patent Counts, supra note 37.
40
See Crouch, supra note 25; Crouch, USPTO Grants, supra note 26.
41
In re Seagate Tech., LLC, 497 F.3d 1360, 1368 (Fed. Cir. 2007). See also 35
U.S.C. § 284 (2012) (authorizing treble damages).
continued . . .
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motivation for harm . . . (9) [w]hether defendant
attempted to conceal its misconduct.42
Under this test, it is questionable if a defendant can avoid a finding
of willfulness and its consequential multiple damages if its explanation
of how the infringement occurred was that searching existing and newly
issued patents was impractical. 43 ³Ostrich-like´ behavior can be
evidence of willfulness.44 Consequently, although the explosion in the
number of potentially relevant patents renders the search task a practical
impossibility, companies must nevertheless attempt it or could be found
reckless and thus subject to multiple damages.45 With the number of
LVVXHGSDWHQWVLQH[LVWHQFHWKHUHLV³DQREMHFWLYHO\KLJKOLNHOLKRRG´46
that at least one of them will read onto any new product, thereby
mandating an expensive, but fruitless search for something that is
unlikely to be found. Alternatively, of course, the current system could
EH FKDQJHG WR UHVROYH WKH +REVRQ¶V FKRLFH EHWZHHQ H[SHQVLYHO\
DWWHPSWLQJ WR FRQGXFW DQ LPSRVVLEOH VHDUFK RU ³ZLOOIXOO\´ IDLOLQJ WR
engage in a futile effort, only to have multiple damages awarded as a
result.
The kinds of failure being discussed here are not without precedent
as another intellectual property system has faced similar issues:
copyright law. In a variety of copyright areas, both statutory and
societal solutions to similar market failures have been developed.47 The
next section will explore the major solutions that have been applied in
copyright law. Following this, some common themes will be extracted
in order to propose techniques that can help resolve the failures of the
patent system being discussed in this article.

42
Liquid Dynamics Corp. v. Vaughan Co., 449 F.3d 1209, 1225 (Fed. Cir. 2006)
(citing Read Corp. v. Portec Inc., 970 F.3d 816, 826±27 (Fed. Cir. 1992)).
43
See id. (imposing an affirmative duty on the infringer to investigate the scope
RIDQRWKHU¶VSDWHQWRQFHthe infringer KDVNQRZOHGJHRIWKHSDWHQW¶VH[LVWHQFH 
44
Cf. Metso Minerals, Inc. Y3RZHUVFUHHQ,QW¶O 'LVWULE/WG)$SS¶[
 )HG&LU  QRWLQJWKDWWKHGLVWULFWFRXUW¶VILQGLQJWKat the defendant
³HYLQFHGRVWULFK-like, head-in-the-VDQGEHKDYLRU´FRXOGMXVWLI\DZLOOIXOQHVVILQGLQJ,
but nevertheless overturning the district court on its finding of infringement (quoting
Metso Minerals, Inc. v. Powerscreen Int'l Distrib. Ltd., 833 F. Supp. 2d 282, 307
(E.D.N.Y. 2011))).
45
See In re Seagate)GDW ³>:@HKROGWKDWSURRIRIZLOOIXO
infringement permitting enhanced damages requires at least a showing of objective
recklessness . . . Accordingly, to establish willful infringement, a patentee must
show by clear and convincing evidence that the infringer acted despite an objectively
high likelihood that its DFWLRQVFRQVWLWXWHGLQIULQJHPHQWRIDYDOLGSDWHQW´ 
46
Id.
47
See infra Part III.A±E.
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III. COMPULSORY AND SITE LICENSING UNDER COPYRIGHT LAW
The examples from copyright law addresses the use and distribution
of music and how it addresses performances, particularly those that
occur through the electronic media. Primarily, these special copyright
rules were established either because individualized license
negotiations to use the expressive work would be impractical 48 or
because market power between the author and the users of the work was
significantly out of balance in a way that would prevent the appropriate
dissemination of the work.49 Copyright law, after all, has to deal with a
significantly higher number of works than are claimed under the patent
law. 50 In each case, Congress attempted to establish a specialized
balance for the compensation of authors that differs from that which
would occur if the market were allowed to operate without special
rules.51 Examining these rules briefly will provide the background for
a similar specialized balancing provision for patents.
A. The Jukebox Provision²17 U.S.C. § 116
Copyright royalty payments for music played on a jukebox have
special rules in the Code.52 Under the system in force today, direct
48
See, e.g., H.R. REP. NO. 94-1476, at 89 (1976), reprinted in 1976
86&&$1 ³,QJHQHUDOWKH&RPPLWWHHEHOLHYHVWKDWFDEOHV\VWHPV
are commercial enterprises whose basic retransmission operations are based on the
carriage of copyrighted program material and that copyright royalties should be paid
by cable operators to the creators of such programs. The Committee recognizes,
however, that it would be impractical and unduly burdensome to require every cable
system to negotiate with every copyright owner whose work was retransmitted by a
FDEOHV\VWHP´ See also Christian Handke, Joint Copyrights Management by
Collecting Societies and Online Platforms: An Economic Analysis 4±6 (June 9,
2015), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2616442.
49
See, e.g., H.R. REP. NO. 94-1476, at 117 ³7KH&RPPLWWHHLVFRJQL]DQWRIWKH
intent of Congress, in enacting the Public Broadcasting Act on November 7, 1967,
that encouragement and support of noncommercial broadcasting is in the public
interest. It is also aware that public broadcasting may encounter problems not
confronted by commercial broadcasting enterprises, due to such factors as the special
nature of programming, repeated use of programs, and, of course, limited financial
resources. Thus, the Committee determined that the nature of public broadcasting
GRHVZDUUDQWVSHFLDOWUHDWPHQWLQFHUWDLQDUHDV´ 
50
See U.S. COPYRIGHT OFF., FISCAL 2013 ANN. REP. 13, available at
http://copyright.gov/reports/annual/2013/ar2013.pdf (showing over 500,000 new
claims for copyright registrations in each of the last five years). Of course, a
registration is never sought for a vast majority of copyrighted works because
registration is not a mandatory prerequisite for copyright validity. See 17 U.S.C. §
408(a) (2012).
51
U.S. COPYRIGHT OFF., supra note 50, at 16±17.
52
See 86&  7KHVWDWXWHXVHVWKHSKUDVH³FRLQ-operated
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negotiation between the jukebox operator and the copyright holder53 is
preferred; but if they do not occur or if they fail, Copyright Royalty
Judges can set rates for the license pursuant to Chapter 8 of the
Copyright Act.54
As originally enacted in the 1976 Act, jukeboxes had a more
particular set of compulsory royalty provisions than the current law
provides.55 Under the original 1976 provision, an annual royalty was
set for each jukebox, which was paid to the Copyright Office.56 The
money that was collected under this provision would then be distributed
to copyright holders who could prove that their work had been
performed on a jukebox.57 1RWVXUSULVLQJO\³SURY>LQJ@HQWLWOHPHQW´58
to royalties could be extraordinarily challenging considering that
jukeboxes are distributed throughout the United States, and are often in
locations that are not readily available for copyright holders to inspect.59
Despite the practical difficulties, the initially enacted compulsory
license for jukeboxes was a step forward for music copyright holders,
as the 1909 Copyright Act provided no compensation for copyright
holders when a work was performed on a jukebox.60 Indeed, the market
disturbance that Congress was attempting to correct with the jukebox
compulsory license provision in the 1976 Copyright Act was the very
fact that no compensation was being provided to holders of music
copyrights when the works were played on a jukebox.61 The drafters of
SKRQRUHFRUGSOD\HU´DVDV\QRQ\PIRUDMXNHER[Id.
53
This would include the holder of the copyright in each musical work available
in the jukebox as well as the holder of the copyright in each performance.
54
See 17 U.S.C. § 116(b). See generally id. §§ 801±05 (2012) (creating
Copyright Royalty Judges and establishing the compulsory royalty rate setting
procedures). The rates established are published at: Compulsory License Fees for
Coin-Operated Phonorecord Players, 37 C.F.R. § 254.3 (2015). Since the 1990s, a
privately negotiated set of rates has been in force. Id.
55
See Copyright Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-553, § 116, 90 Stat. 2541, 2564
(codified as amended at 17 U.S.C. § 116 (2012)).
56
See 17 U.S.C. § 116(b) (2012).
57
Costs incurred by the Copyright Office and the Royalty Tribunals were to be
deducted from the amounts collected. See id. § 116(c)(1)-(4).
58
Id. § 116(c)(4)(A)-(B).
59
See 2 MELVILLE B. NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT §
8.17(B)(7) (2014).
60
Copyright Act of 1909, Pub. L. No. 60-349, § 1(e), 35 Stat. 1075, 1075±76
³7KHUHSURGXFWion or rendition of a musical composition by or upon coin-operated
machines shall not be deemed a public performance for profit unless a fee is charged
IRUDGPLVVLRQWRWKHSODFHZKHUHVXFKUHSURGXFWLRQRUUHQGLWLRQRFFXUV´ repealed
by Copyright Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-553, § 116, 90 Stat. 2541, 2564 (codified
as amended at 17 U.S.C. § 116 (2012)).
61
See H.R. REP. NO. 94-1476, at 89 (1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N.
 ³7KHSUHVHQWEODQNHWMXNHER[H[HPSWLRQVKRXOGQRWEHFRQWLQXHG
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the 1976 Act determined that the step from requiring no compensation
by the jukebox industry to requiring normal, fully negotiated copyright
compensation was too extreme, so a compulsory license was
appropriate. 62 There was also a practical problem of the number of
negotiations that would be necessary as the jukeboxes of the era could
each store one-hundred distinct songs.63
B. The Cable Television Provision²17 U.S.C. § 111
The provisions of section 111 grant compulsory licenses that allow,
among other similar uses,64 a cable television company to rebroadcast
over-the-air television signals to its subscribers. 65 The basic system
establishes royalty rates, which are paid by the cable company based on
its gross receipts from its subscribers.66 Subsequently, any copyright
Whatever justification existed for it in 1909 exists no longer, and one class of
commercial users of music should not be completely absolved from liability when
QRQHRIWKHRWKHUVHQMR\VDQ\H[HPSWLRQ´ 2IFRXUVHE\WKHWLPHWKHIL[ZDVPDGH
jukeboxes were no longer as important in the distribution as they had been through
the middle of the twentieth century. See TAYLOR COWEN, IN PRAISE OF
COMMERCIAL CULTURE 164±66 (2000) (noting that three-fourths of the records
produced in the 1940s were used in jukeboxes); The Jukebox, it Seems, Is a Hit of
the Past, N.Y. TIMES (July 21, 1982),
http://www.nytimes.com/1982/07/21/garden/the-jukebox-it-seems-is-a-hit-of-thepast.html (noting a decline in the number of jukeboxes by more than fifty percent
from the early 1950s to the 1980s). See also KERRY SEGRAVE, JUKEBOXES: AN
AMERICAN SOCIAL HISTORY 164±66 (2002) (discussing the same).
62
See H.R. REP. NO. 94-1476, at 89 ³8QOLNHRWKHUFRPPHUFLDOPXVLFXVHUV
who have been subject to full copyright liability from the beginning and have made
the necessary economic and business adjustments over a period of time, the whole
structure of the jukebox industry has been based on the existence of the copyright
H[HPSWLRQ´ 
63
See Seeburg Select-O-Matic Jukebox, VINTAGE VENDING (Aug. 1, 2008),
http://www.vintagevending.com/seeburg-select-o-matic-jukebox.
64
This section of the Copyright Act of 1976 is among its most complex
provisions. See Am. Broad. Co., Inc. v. Aereo, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2498, 2506 (2014)
³6HFWLRQFUHDWHVDFRPSOH[Kighly detailed compulsory licensing scheme that
sets out the conditions, including the payment of compulsory fees, under which cable
V\VWHPVPD\UHWUDQVPLWEURDGFDVWV´ H.R. REP. NO. 94-1476, at 88 ³7KHFRPSOH[
DQGHFRQRPLFDOO\LPSRUWDQWSUREOHPRIµVHFRQGDU\WUDQVPLVVLRQV¶LVFRQVLGHUHGLQ
section 111. For the most part, the section is directed at the operation of cable
television systems . . . [h]owever, other forms of secondary transmissions are also
considered, including apartment house and hotel systems, wired instructional
V\VWHPVFRPPRQFDUULHUVQRQSURILWµERRVWHUV¶DQGWUDQVODWRUVDQGVHFRQGDU\
WUDQVPLVVLRQVRISULPDU\WUDQVPLVVLRQVWRFRQWUROOHGJURXSV´ 
65
See 17 U.S.C. § 111(a)(3) (2014). For the current rates, see Adjustment of
Royalty Fees for Secondary Transmissions by Satellite Carriers, 37 C.F.R. §
386.2(b) (2015).
66
See 17 U.S.C. § 111(d)(1) (2012). Royalty rates are determined based on
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holder who claims to have a work that was rebroadcast must make a
claim for compensation by filing a claim under the Copyright Royalty
system set forth in Chapter 8 of the Copyright Act and can be awarded
a proportionate share of the revenues collected.67 Again, as was the case
with jukeboxes, if the parties claiming royalties can agree on how the
money should be distributed, Congress supports that agreement.68
The cable television compulsory royalties system initially was made
necessary by the failure of the Copyright Act of 1909 to require cable
systems to provide any compensation for the rebroadcast of the
signals. 69 After making the determination that cable television
providers should pay royalties, the lack of such a requirement under the
1909 Act suggested that transitional provisions, rather than immediately
using an open market system, would be necessary. 70 Beyond the
transitional issue, there was congressional doubt that retransmission
royalties could be adequately addressed by the open market:
The Committee recognizes . . . that it would be
impractical and unduly burdensome to require every
cable system to negotiate with every copyright owner
whose work was retransmitted by a cable system.
Accordingly, the Committee has determined . . . to
establish a compulsory copyright license for the
retransmission of those over-the-air broadcast signals
that a cable system is authorized to carry pursuant to the
rules and regulations of the FCC.71
C. 7KH ³&RYHU´ RI D 0XVLF 3HUIRUPDQFH 3URYLVLRQ²17 U.S.C. §
115
Under section 115, a performer is granted a compulsory license for
making a phonorecord72 of a copyright-protected musical work as long
subscribers who are not physically within the range of the normal broadcast signal.
See id. § 111(d)(1)(B).
67
See id. § 111(d)(4)(B).
68
See id. § 111(d)(4)(A).
69
See H.R. REP. NO. 94-1476, at 89.
70
See 17 U.S.C. § 111 (2012).
71
H.R. REP. NO. 94-1476, at 89.
72
³3KRQRUHFRUG´LVGHILQHGXQGHUWKH&RS\ULJKW$FWWRPHDQ³PDWHULDOREMHFWV
in which sounds, other than those accompanying a motion picture or other
audiovisual work, are fixed by any method now known or later developed, and from
which the sounds can be perceived, reproduced, or otherwise communicated, either
directly or with the aid of a machine or device´86&  See also
London-Sire Records, Inc. v. Doe 1, 542 F. Supp. 2d 153, 170±71 (D. Mass. 2008)
³7KH&RS\ULJKW$FWWKXVGRHVQRWXVHPDWHULDOLW\LQLWVPRVWREYLRXVVHQVH²to
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as that work has already been performed on a phonorecord.73 A prior
phonorecord-captured performance authorized by the copyright holder
is a prerequisite, and no compulsory license is available for music that
has not been rendered on a phonorecord with the copyright KROGHU¶V
consent.74
Unlike the two compulsory licenses discussed above, this license
existed under the 1909 Act. 75 Congress continued the license after
determining that it was needed to appropriately balance the market for
recorded music.76 The modified license found in the 1976 Act clarified
some aspects of its applicability77 and made it subject to the royalty
determination provisions in the 1976 Act that allowed for nonlegislative modifications of the rates.78 This continues today under the
procedures established in Chapter 8 of the Copyright Act. 79 As is
typical, however, Congress expressly supports private understandings
about copyright compensation and gives a private agreement preference
over Chapter 8 defined rates.80
D. The Non-Profit Broadcast Entity²17 U.S.C. § 118
Public broadcasters are given a compulsory license to use published
non-dramatic musical, pictorial, graphic and sculptural works in Section
118 of the Copyright Act. 81 Royalties for use are set by Copyright
mean a tangible object with a certain heft, like a book or compact disc. Rather, it
UHIHUVWRPDWHULDOLW\DVDPHGLXPLQZKLFKDFRS\ULJKWHGZRUNFDQEHµIL[HG¶´ 
73
See 17 U.S.C. § 115(a)(1) (2012); H.R. REP. NO. 94-DW ³8QGHU
[Section 115], . . . a musical composition that has been reproduced in phonorecords
with the permission of the copyright owner may generally be reproduced in
phonorecords by another person, if that person notifies the copyright owner and pays
DVSHFLILHGUR\DOW\´ 7KHFXUUHQWGHILQHGUR\DOWLHVFDQEHIRXQGDW5R\DOW\5DWHV
for Making and Distributing Phonorecords. 37 C.F.R. § 385.3(a) (2015).
74
See 17 U.S.C. § 115(a)(1) (2012).
75
See Copyright Act of 1909, Pub. L. No. 60-349, § 1(e), 35 Stat. 1075, 1075±
76 (repealed 1976).
76
Cf. H.R. REP. NO. 94-1476, at 107 (citing H.R. REP. NO. 83, 90th Cong., at
66±67 (1967), which discussed the dispute between maintaining the license to
VXSSRUWWKHH[LVWLQJPDUNHWIRUUHFRUGHGPXVLFZKLOHDFNQRZOHGJLQJWKDW³WKH
special antitrust problems existing in 1909" no longer existed).
77
See id. at 107±08.
78
See 17 U.S.C. § 115(c)(3)(C) (2012).
79
See id.
80
See id. § 115(c)(3)(B). The reality today is that compulsory license royalty
rates serve as a cap as most music performances that cover prior works are
negotiated. See 2 NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 59, § 8.04(I).
81
See 17 U.S.C. § 118(c) (2012). Currently defined rates can be found at: Use of
Certain Copyrighted Works in Connection with Noncommercial Educational
Broadcasting, 37 C.F.R. § 381 (2015).
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Royalty Judges under Chapter 8.82
This license is the one that is most directly designed to satisfy a need
for the distribution of copyrighted works because it is in the public
interest even though market economics may prevent this from
happening:
The Committee is cognizant of the intent of Congress, in
enacting the Public Broadcasting Act on November 7,
1967, that encouragement and support of
noncommercial broadcasting is in the public interest. It
is also aware that public broadcasting may encounter
problems not confronted by commercial broadcasting
enterprises, due to such factors as the special nature of
programming, repeated use of programs, and, of course,
limited financial resources. Thus, the Committee
determined that the nature of public broadcasting does
warrant special treatment in certain areas.83

82

See 17 U.S.C. § 118(b)(4) (2012). In the typical arrangement, a private
agreement will be enforced over the rates set by the Royalty Judges. See id. §
118(b)(4); id. § 118(c).
83
H.R. REP. NO. 94-1476, at 117 (1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5659,
5732.
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E. Performing Rights Organizations²Collective Site Licenses
Performing Rights Organizations such as ASCAP 84 and BMI 85
allow musicians to collect royalties where it would otherwise be
difficult or impossible. 86 Equally, the organizations allow facilities
such as concert halls to lessen the likelihood that performance of a
copyrighted work at the facility will be infringing because the catalog
of works held by the organizations is quite broad.87 Each organization
negotiates a license agreement with entities that commonly use multiple
copyrighted works, such as night clubs, concert halls, radio and
television broadcasters, etc.88 By entering into the license agreement,
the entity is given a site license to use all compositions within the
ASCAP or BMI catalog of music.89 For example, if a musical group
performs a copyrighted song in a performance at a concert hall, the hall
itself will not be considered an infringer, as it will have a license for the
performance; otherwise, the hall could have copyright liability
regardless of the responsibilities of the musicians.90 The compensation
that is paid to the Performing Rights Organization is distributed to the

84

See What is ASCAP?, ASCAP, http://www.ascap.com/about/ (last visited
Mar. 7, 2016  ³>7@KH$PHULFDQ6RFLHW\RI&RPSRVHUV$XWKRUVDQG3XEOLVKHUV
(ASCAP) [is] a membership association of more than 525,000 US composers,
songwriters, lyricists and music publishers of every kind of music . . . . We protect
the rights of ASCAP members by licensing and distributing royalties for the nonGUDPDWLFSXEOLFSHUIRUPDQFHVRIWKHLUFRS\ULJKWHGZRUNV´ 
85
See generally Our Role, BMI, http://www.bmi.com/about (last visited Mar. 7,
2016  ³%0,VXSSRUWVEXVLQHVVHVand organizations that play music publicly by
offering blanket music licenses that permit them to play more than 10.5 million
PXVLFDOZRUNV´ 
86
Cf., e.g., Broad. Music, Inc. v. McDade & Sons, Inc., 928 F. Supp. 2d 1120,
1124 (D. Ariz. 2013).
87
See id.
88
See ASCAP Music License Agreements and Reporting Forms, ASCAP,
http://www.ascap.com/licensing/licensefinder (last visited Mar. 7, 2016) (listing the
different types of entities for which a license is available); Music Users: Apply for
your BMI Music License, BMI, http://www.bmi.com/licensing (last visited Mar. 7,
2016) (listing some types of entities and allowing for the search for others).
89
See ASCAP Licensing: Frequently Asked Questions: What does the ASCAP
license do?, ASCAP, http://www.ascap.com/licensing/licensingfaq.aspx#general
(last visited Mar. 7, 2016); Licensing FAQ: What does a business really get with a
BMI Music License?, BMI, http://www.bmi.com/licensing (last visited Mar. 7,
2016).
90
See, e.g., Broad. Music, Inc. v. Niro's Palace, Inc., 619 F. Supp. 958, 961
1',OO  ³&RS\LQJFDQWDNHPDQ\IRUPV7KHPRVWVWUDLJKWIRUZDUGW\SHRI
copying is the public performance of another's musical composition. Moreover, not
only is the performer liable for infringement, but so is anyone who sponsors the
SHUIRUPDQFH´  LQWHUQDOFLWDWLRQRPLWWHG 
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actual copyright holders by the organization.91
IV. THE UNIFYING CONCEPTS BEHIND THE COPYRIGHT
COMPULSORY AND PERFORMING RIGHTS LICENSES AND THE
MATCHING THEMES IN MODERN PATENT PRACTICE THAT JUSTIFY
DEVELOPING SIMILAR MANDATORY PATENT LICENSES
When the licensing methodologies discussed in part III above are
analyzed, several common concepts emerge, most of which are
applicable to solving issues arising in modern patent use. These themes
segment into four major areas: (1) open market negotiations not being a
realistic expectation; (2) enforcement against infringement being at best
problematic, or at worst impossible; (3) an holder¶V DVVHUWLRQ RI
intellectual property rights is overly self-centered, imposing costs that
DUHVLJQLILFDQWO\KLJKHUWKDQWKHYDOXHUHWXUQHGE\WKHZRUN¶VFUHDWLRQ;
and (4) a need to protect a newly created market for a developing kind
of work. Each of these will be discussed in turn.
A. Expecting the Parties to Engage in an Open Market Negotiation
is not Realistic
The most common theme that interconnects the five copyright
compulsory or collective site licenses is that a face-to-face negotiation
for the rights to use a particular kind of copyrighted work is often not
practical. For jukeboxes, it would be impractical to expect the operator
of each box to discuss royalty payments with every artist represented on
a record within the box as over 100,000 songs can now be found on a
modern jukebox.92 A similar, but more complex problem is raised by a
FDEOH WHOHYLVLRQ V\VWHP¶V UHEURDGFDVW RI D VKRZ, as each show could
involve independently owned and controlled copyrights in the dramatic
script and its performance as well as the music and other copyrighted
works that are incorporated. 93 For both record covers and nonprofit
91

See ASCAP Payment System: Introduction, ASCAP,
http://www.ascap.com/members/payment/ (last visited Mar. 7, 2016); How We Pay
Royalties: General Royalty Information, BMI,
http://www.bmi.com/creators/royalty/general_information (last visited Mar. 7,
2016).
92
See 17 U.S.C. § 114 (2012). See also Rock-Ola Bubbler Nostalgic Music
Center, BMI GAMING.COM, http://www.bmigaming.com/games-jukebox-digital.htm
(last visited Mar. 7, 2016) (describing ability of digital jukebox to hold 125,000
songs). As a result, multiple negotiations might be needed for each song because
both the rights of the music copyright and performance copyright can be affected.
93
See Fara Daun, Comment, The Content Shop: Toward an Economic Legal
Structure for Clearing and Licensing Multimedia Content, 30 LOY. L.A. L. REV.
215, 215±18 (1996) (discussing the copyright issues raised by multimedia). See also
continued . . .
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uses, the negotiation difficulty is a result of inherent market imbalances
as neither a typical singer nor a public broadcasting system can obtain
the copyright clearances needed to function because of their limited
financial means. 94 Finally, for performance venues, negotiating for
permission for each song that is going to be performed would be
impractical; after all, the venue may not even know in advance what
songs are going to be performed by a performer.95
The inability to negotiate is typical in the modern patent system as
well. As discussed in Part II above, patent enforcement is no longer
based on the reading on process that theoretically underlies the system
as doing so is no longer practical. 96 Whether the root cause of this
transformation is based on the overwhelming quantity of patents being
LVVXHGRURQPDUNHWSOD\HUV¶GHFLVLRQVWRXse their patent portfolios in
ways not designed by the law does not matter, as the reality is that open
market negotiations for most patents is an unrealistic expectation.97
B. Enforcing Against Infringement is Problematic
A second common theme that ties copyright licenses together is that
practical enforcement of rights is often difficult to impossible. For
example, the holder of the rights to a song or its performance may find
it close to impossible to know if those rights are infringed by a jukebox
located in a private club, or by a concert given in a church recreation
hall.98 First, few copyright holders have the resources to survey all of
the possible infringers around the country. 99 Even if the copyright
Stacey M. Byrnes, Copyright Licenses, New Technology and Default Rules:
Converging Media, Diverging Courts?, 20 LOY. L.A. ENT. L. REV. 243, 244±46
(2000) (discussing difficulty of determining whether a new use is authorized under
an earlier license).
94
See H.R. REP. NO. 94-1476, at 117 (1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N.
5659, 5732 (noting financial limitations on public broadcasting). See also Daun,
supra note 93, at 232 (discussing covers).
95
See Daun, supra note 93, at 262 (discussing blanket licenses).
96
See generally Brad Plumer, Software Patents are Impractical²8QOHVV:H¶YH
got 2 million Extra Lawyers, WASH. POST (Mar. 9, 2012),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/ezra-klein/post/software-patents-areimpractical--unless-weve-got-2-million-extralawyers/2012/03/09/gIQARerW1R_blog.html.
97
As is discussed in more depth below, pioneering patents that develop a new
technology require separate consideration.
98
ASCAP Payment System: Keeping Track of Performances, ASCAP,
http://www.ascap.com/members/payment/keepingtrack.aspx (last visited Mar. 7,
2016).
99
Id. (explaining the difficulty in determining copyright use); ASCAP Payment
System: The ASCAP Surveys, ASCAP,
http://www.ascap.com/members/payment/surveys.aspx (last visited Mar. 7, 2016)
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holder could locate every jukebox that contains a phonorecord of a
copyrighted song or performance, infringement does not occur until the
phonorecord is played,100 which could be at any hour of the day or night.
Mere possession of a legitimate phonorecord does not constitute
infringement.101 Similarly, a concert in a church hall may only be open
to members of the church and never be advertised to the public, yet it
remains an infringing ³public performance´ under the Copyright Act.102
The use of mandatory royalties and collective societies cannot eliminate
these problems of enforcement, particularly by smaller entities, but can
significantly limit the problem among more commercial users of
copyrighted music.
In many patent-intensive industries, similar enforcement problems
occur. For software- or business method-based inventions, in particular,
it can be difficult or impossible to know whether a competitor is using
a claimed invention, as it is likely to be incorporated into a complex
software system or hidden in the back-office business processing of a
company.103 For software, although it is theoretically possible to reverse
engineer a computer program to determine how it is designed and
whether it practices a patented invention, the reality is often different.
In the best of circumstances, reverse-engineering software is
technologically challenging, 104 but even if it should prove possible,
many products are distributed using purported licensing agreements that
(noting the same).
100
17 U.S.C. § 501(a) (2012) (explaining that infringement occurs when any
exclusive rights of the copyright holder, provided in section 106, are violated); 17
U.S.C. § 106(6) (2012) (listing the right to play a phonorecord as an exclusive right
of the copyright holder).
101
See 17 U.S.C. § 106(1) (2012) (listing the reproduction of a phonorecord as
copyright infringement). See also 17 U.S.C. § 106(4) (listing the public performance
of a phonorecord as copyright infringement); 17 U.S.C. § 503(a)(1)(A) (2012)
(authorizing seizure and destruction of an unauthorized phonorecord; Jalbert v.
Grautski, 554 F. Supp. 2d 57, 68 (D. Mass. 2008) (explaining that it is the
³GLVWULEXWLRQRIFRSLHVRIDZRUNWRWKHSXEOLF´WKDt constitutes copyright
infringement under 17 U.S.C. § 106 (2012)).
102
A performance is considered public under the Copyright Act when it is
³SHUIRUP>HG@ . . . at a place open to the public or at any place where a substantial
number of persons outside of a normal circle of a family and its social
acquaintances is gathered´86&  (emphasis added). As a nonhuman, churches have no family or social acquaintances. Cf. Columbia Pictures Ind.,
Inc. v. Redd Horne, Inc., 749 F.2d 154 (3d Cir. 1984).
103
See Business Method Patents, IPWATCHDOG,
http://www.ipwatchdog.com/patent/business-method-patents/ (last visited Mar. 7,
2016).
104
See Mathew Schwartz, Reverse-Engineering, COMPUTERWORLD (Nov. 12,
2001, 12:00 AM PT), http://www.computerworld.com/article/2585652/appdevelopment/reverse-engineering.html.
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prohibit reverse-engineering from being attempted, 105 making an
attempt to discover potential infringement a breach of contract. For
business-based patents, the problem can be even more intractable.
Some business patents are practiced in front of the customer, potentially
allowing the technology to be observed±±for example, one can see how
French fries are prepared at most fast food restaurants±±but others are
completely hidden±±one cannot see how a brokerage determines proxy
voting rights for shares held in a street name without access to the
FRPSDQ\¶VEDFNRIILFH.
C. Avoiding Excessively Selfish Assertions of an Intellectual
Property Right is Required
With some uses of copyrighted music, requiring a one-on-one
negotiation for the use of the work will lead to circumstances that can
be best described as a failure of intellectual property law to achieve its
primary goal: the wide dissemination of the copyrighted work.106 For
example, the holder of a copyrighted musical composition may wish to
prevent anyone save himself or herself to sing a copyrighted song in a
public performance. Theoretically, insisting on this methodology could
maximize the financial return to the holder, particularly if the
composition is popular. If the public wants to hear a performance of the
song, the copyright holder gains compensation for both the music and
the performance rather than just the music alone. 107 This model of
distribution, however, discounts the reality of how music tends to
spread. After all, if people hear a new song that strikes their fancy, they
DUH OLNHO\ WR OHDYH ³ZKLVWOLQJ WKH WXQHs DQG HYHU\WKLQJ´ 108 with the
corresponding demand for more performances than the copyright holder
can satisfy. The cover license provision in the Copyright Act works
against this consequence by giving, in effect, the copyright holder only
the first opportunity of releasing the song on a phonorecord but, having
105

See David N. Pruitt, Beyond Fair Use: The Right to Contract Around
Copyright Protection of Reverse Engineering in the Software Industry, 6 CHI.-KENT
J. INTELL. PROP. 66 (2006). It may be that such a contractual attempt to prevent
reverse-engineering by all customers constitutes an inappropriate use of state law in
a way that is preempted by federal intellectual property policy. See Ralph D.
Clifford, The Federal Circuit's Cruise to Uncharted Waters: How Patent Protection
for Algorithms and Business Methods May Sink the UCITA and State Intellectual
Property Protection, 73 TEMP. L. REV. 1241, 1269 (2000).
106
See 1 MELVILLE B. NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT §
1.03[A] (Matthew Bender ed., 2007).
107
See 17 U.S.C. § 115(c)-(d) (2012).
108
PETER SCHICKELE, ³8QEHJXQ´6\PSKRQ\, on AN HYSTERIC RETURN P.D.Q.
BACH AT CARNEGIE HALL (Vanguard Records 1966).
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done so, all others may also, paying the copyright holder what is
determined to be a fair royalty for the privilege of using the underlying
music.109
In the world of patents, this overly selfish assertion of rights is also
seen. As a primary example, a patent holder can exercise a patent to
prevent all others from making, using or selling the patented invention
even though the holder is not planning on using the invention.110 In
effect, the patent holder is using the patent to injure others by preventing
their use of the invention for no return.111
The early days of the electronics industry serve as an example of
how the strong assertion of patent rights can have a significantly
negative effect on the development of a technology. John Fleming, the
first individual to obtain a patent in what became the electronics space,
was granted a patent on the vacuum-tube diode.112 Less than two years
later, Lee de Forest was issued a patent on the vacuum-tube triode.113
Although the triode has functions that are quite different than the
diode²fundamentally, a diode transforms electricity from alternating
to direct form while a triode can amplify signals114²a triode can also
be used as a diode and, more critically, a triode reads on to the Fleming
diode patent. 115 Unfortunately, both Fleming and de Forest strongly
asserted their patents, resulting in a significant delay in the development
of electronic technology as no one could safely license the technology
from either of the parties.116
Today, the use of a patent to prevent anyone from using a
WHFKQRORJ\KDVEHHQDVVRFLDWHGVWURQJO\ZLWKD³SDWHQWWUROO´RIWHQQRZ
109

See 17 U.S.C. § 115(a) (2012).
See 35 U.S.C. § 271(d) (2012).
111
See id.
112
U.S. Patent No. 803,684 (filed Apr. 19, 1905).
113
U.S. Patent No. 841,387 (filed Oct. 25, 1906).
114
See Early Tube History, ALL ABOUT CIRCUITS,
http://www.allaboutcircuits.com/textbook/semiconductors/chpt-13/early-tubehistory/ (last visited Mar. 7, 2016) (describing the diode); The Triode, ALL ABOUT
CIRCUITS, http://www.allaboutcircuits.com/textbook/semiconductors/chpt-13/thetriode/ (last visited Mar. 7, 2016) (describing the triode); see also Radio Corp. of
$PY5DGLR(QJ¶J/DEs., Inc., 293 U.S. 1, 10±11 (1934) (discussing the use of
both devices for capturing and producing radio waves).
115
See Marconi Wireless Tel. Co. of Am. v. De Forest Radio Tel. & Tel. Co.,
243 F. 560, 565 (2d Cir. 1917). See also Deepa Varadarajan, Improvement
Doctrines, 21 GEO. MASON L. REV. 657, 688 (2014) (discussing how an earlier
³EORFNLQJ´SDWHQWFDQSUHYHQWXVHRIDQLPSURYHPHQWSDWHQW 
116
See Peter E. Mayeux, Fleming, Sir John Ambrose 1849±1945 British
Electrical Engineer; Inventor of the Vacuum Tube, 2 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF RADIO 972
(Christopher H. Sterling ed.,   ³/LWLJDWLRQRIWKHGH)RUHVWDQG)OHPLQJSDWHQWV
FRQWLQXHGIRU\HDUV&RXUWGHFLVLRQVLQWLHGPRVWFRPSDQLHVLQWRNQRWV´ 
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FDOOHGD³QRQ-SUDFWLFLQJHQWLW\´RU³13(´117 What is being identified
in this article, however, is narrower than a NPE; instead, a distinction is
being made between a NPE that actively seeks to allow others to use a
patented invention by entering into license agreements118 and one that
seeks to prevent a technology from being used although no attempts are
made to market the technology. Where patent rights are used solely to
SUHYHQWXVHUDWKHUWKDQWRHQDEOHLWWKH³OLFHQVLQJ´SURWRFROHTXDWHVWR
the third theme underlying copyright compulsory licenses.119
D. Protecting a Newly Emerging Market
The final common theme that underlies these copyright licenses is
the need to respond to a newly developing market. Sometimes this new
market for copyrighted works was a result of the prior law leaving the
use free from copyright restrictions. 120 Other times, the market
developed because of a novel technology.121 In both cases, Congress
determined that an open, one-on-one negotiation between the copyright
holders and the new users would be ruinous to the development of the
newly emerging distribution method.122
The primary example of a market being protected is the jukebox
provision in the 1976 Copyright Act.123 The 1909 Act left the use of
music by a jukebox completely free from copyright limitations. 124
Congress felt that the transition from not having to pay any
compensation to having to negotiate a royalty provision for each song
was likely to cause the extinction of the jukebox industry.125
A good example of the second type of market-protection need is
shown by the cable television provisions. 126 This industry was
developing at the time the 1976 Act was being crafted.127 Congress was
fearful that the parties controlling copyrighted works on the existing
broadcast media would be likely to prevent the use of their copyrights
117

See, e.g., Kristen Osenga, Formerly Manufacturing Entities: Piercing the
³3DWHQW7UROO´5KHWRULF, 47 CONN. L. REV. 435, 437±41 (2014).
118
For example, most universities would fit into this category. See Mark A.
Lemley, Are Universities Patent Trolls?, 18 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT.
L.J. 611 (2008).
119
See infra Part IV.D.
120
See supra Part III.A.
121
See supra Part III.B.
122
See H.R. REP. NO. 94-1476, at 89 (1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N.
5659, 5728.
123
See 17 U.S.C. § 116 (2012); supra Part III-A.
124
See supra note 60.
125
See id.
126
See 17 U.S.C. § 111 (2012); supra Part III-B
127
See supra Part III-B.
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by the cable industry as a way of preventing the cable industry itself
from growing.128
Unlike the first three common themes that unify the copyright
mandatory license provisions, patent law differs somewhat
dramatically. It is an acceptable motive, as a general matter, for the
holder of a patent to use it to prevent a competitor from entering a
marketplace.129 The basic legal right given by each system explains this
difference. A copyright holder has the affirmative right to use the
copyrighted work; 130 a patent holder does not, and can only prevent
others from using the invention.131 More fundamentally, however, is
the purpose of the patent system²the development of new technology,
broadly defined.132 As the law of patents is specifically designed to
regulate the entry of new technologies into society, the overall system
is not affected adversely by new inventions in the way the copyright
system often is.133
V. APPLYING COMPULSORY LICENSING TO PATENTS
A. Why Patent Licenses Are Needed
The current patent system does not, in general, use compulsory
licenses, and patent holders²outside of a few narrow areas134 or where
128

See supra Part III-B.
See generally Christopher R. Leslie, The Anticompetitive Effects of
Unenforced Invalid Patents, 91 MINN L. REV. 101, 119±20 (2006) (describing the
increased costs of market entry caused by the existence of invalid patents).
130
See 17 U.S.&   ³>7@KHRZQHURIFRS\ULJKWXQGHUWKLVWLWOHKDV
the exclusive rights to do and to authorize DQ\RIWKHIROORZLQJ´) (emphasis
added).
131
See 86& D     ³(YHU\SDWHQWVKDOO . . . grant to the
patentee . . . the right to exclude others from using, offering for sale, or selling
WKURXJKRXWWKH8QLWHG6WDWHV´) (emphasis added).
132
See U.S. CONST. DUWFO ³7RSURPRWHWKH3URJUHss of Science . . .
´ 
133
New technologies that can preserve artistic expressions have historically
been responsible for causing then existing copyright provisions to become nonfunctional. Jessica D. Litman, Copyright Legislation and Technological Change, 68
OR. L. REV. 275, 276±77, 281±82 (1989). For example, piano rolls, an early form of
recorded music, were not within the scope of protection found in the Copyright Act
when they were first developed, leaving that version of a musical expression without
copyright protection for decades. See White-Smith Music PubO¶J Co. v. Apollo Co.,
209 U.S. 1, 13 (1908).
134
See, e.g., Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. § 7608 (2012) (allowing the attorney
JHQHUDOWRUHTXLUHWKHRZQHURIDQ\SDWHQWWKDWLVQRW³UHDVRQDEO\DYDLODEOH´WR
license the patent if such licensing is necessary to comply with certain aspects of the
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required as a remedy135²can choose when and if to authorize others to
use their patented technology. 136 As discussed above, however, the
current way in which businesses are using patents introduces significant
problems, and results in the redefinition of the underlying principle of
the patent system of rewarding disclosure with the ability to monopolize
the technology.137 Numerous articles have been written that attempt to
address some of these problems. 138 It may be time to acknowledge,
however, that the actors who operate the patent system, as well as those
who gain its benefits, have insufficient motivation to do anything but
preserve the status quo. 139 Consequently, in order to restore its
operating principles, alternative mechanisms need to be explored to
redirect WKH V\VWHP WR VHUYH VRFLHW\¶V UHTXLVLWHV The basic thesis
expressed here is that mandatory licenses patterned after the ones used
in the copyright system would serve to re-equilibrate the system and, in
particular, would resolve the two primary problems that were identified
IRUVROXWLRQLQ3DUW,RIWKLVSDSHUXVLQJSDWHQWSRUWIROLRVDV³KD\VWDFN
clubs;´DQGRYHUFRPLQJGLVDEOLQJQXPHURVLW\
1. Haystack Clubs
Using a patent portfolio, rather than individual patents, as a
&OHDQ$LU$FWDQGLI³WKHUHDUHQRUHDVRQDEOHDOWHUQDWLYHPHWKRGV´WRDFKLHYH
compliance); Atomic Energy Act, 42 U.S.C. § 2183 (2012) (granting similar
authority to the Nuclear Regulatory Commission).
135
See United States v. Glaxo Grp., Ltd., 410 U.S. 52, 58±59 (1973)
DFNQRZOHGJLQJWKDWD³GHPDQGIRUPDQGDWRU\VDOHVDQGUHDVRQDEOH-royalty licensing
[are] well-HVWDEOLVKHGIRUPVRIUHOLHIZKHQQHFHVVDU\WRDQHIIHFWLYHUHPHG\´ 
136
See SCM Corp. v. Xerox Corp., 645 F.2d 1195, 1204 (2d Cir. 1981  ³:KHUH
a patent holder, however, merely exercises his right to exclude others from making,
using, or selling the invention by refusing unilaterally to license his patent for its
seventeen-year term, such conduct is expressly permitted by the patent laws´
(internal citations and quotation marks omitted)); Intergraph Corp. v. Intel Corp.,
195 F.3d 1346, 1362±63 (Fed. Cir. 1999).
137
See supra part II.A.
138
See, e.g., Maayan Perel, From Non-Practicing Entities (NPES) to NonPracticed Patents (NPPS): A Proposal for A Patent Working Requirement, 83 U.
CIN. L. REV. 747 (2015); Colleen Chien, Startups and Patent Trolls, 17 STAN. TECH.
L. REV. 461 (2014); David L. Schwartz & Jay P. Kesan, Analyzing the Role of NonPracticing Entities in the Patent System, 99 CORNELL L. REV. 425 (2014); Mark A.
Lemley & A. Douglas Melamed, Missing the Forest for the Trolls, 113 COLUM. L.
REV. 2117 (2013).
139
See R. Polk Wagner, Understanding Patent-Quality Mechanisms, 157 U. PA.
L. REV.    ³:KDWKDVODUJHO\EHHQORVWLn this drumbeat for
improved patent quality is that the modern patent system affirmatively encourages
low patent quality²the incentives at work are such that we cannot reasonably expect
anything other than very large numbers of low-TXDOLW\SDWHQWV´ (footnote omitted)).
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litigation club presents the same kind of system failure as that which
justified the special copyright rules for jukeboxes and cable television.
For both of these copyright systems, individual negotiations would be
impractical because there are too many rights holders involved and the
odds are too great that a mistake regarding coverage will result in
liability. 140 Consequently, automatic negotiations in the form of a
statutory license are used.141
Allowing the use of a haystack of patents causes a similar failure.
Just as an operator of a jukebox or cable system cannot realistically deal
with thousands of individual rights negotiations to be allowed to engage
in its everyday operation, a company cannot do so when faced with
hundreds or thousands of patents.142 Without a viable mechanism to
deteUPLQHLIHDFKRIDWKRXVDQGSDWHQWVUHDGVRQWRDFRPSDQ\¶VSURGXFW
the company is left with no harbor to avoid potential infringement.143
Like the copyrighted music in a jukebox or television shows being
rebroadcast by a cable system, the reality is that individual patent-bypatent analysis for the ones in a haystack portfolio is impossible.
2. Disabling Numerosity
While the haystack club is a tactical business approach that has been
adopted to maximize the economic return from a patent portfolio²
often beyond the legally justifiable return from the individual patents
contained within it²numerosity is a problem inherent in the current
patent system.144 With 300,000 newly issued patents each year on top
of the base of 3 million active patents, it has become impossible to
absorb newly disclosed technology, particularly within the most
innovative fields.145 The most similar copyright problem is the public
performance of music as there are millions of public performances of
copyrighted music on an annual basis. 146 The primary copyright
140

See Brent Skorup, What Market Failure? The Weak Transaction Cost
Argument for TV Compulsory Licenses, THE TECHNOLOGY LIBERATION FRONT (July
31, 2015), https://techliberation.com/2015/07/31/what-market-failure-the-weaktransaction-cost-argument-for-tv-compulsory-licenses/.
141
See id.
142
Stefan Wagner, $UHµ3DWHQW7KLFNHWV¶6PRWKHULQJ,QQRYDWLRQ", YALE
INSIGHTS (Apr. 22, 2015), http://insights.som.yale.edu/insights/are-patent-thicketssmothering-innovation/.
143
See Steven Levy, The Patent Problem, WIRED (Nov. 13, 2012, 6:30 AM),
http://www.wired.com/2012/11/ff-steven-levy-the-patent-problem/.
144
Id.
145
See Crouch, supra note 25; Crouch, USPTO Grants, supra note 26.
146
³3HUIRUPDQFH´LVDWHUPRIDUWXQGHUWKH&RS\ULJKW$FW, and includes:
³UHFLW>LQJ@, render[ing], play[ing], danc[ing], or act[ing] it, either directly or by
PHDQVRIDQ\GHYLFHRUSURFHVV´86&  6LPLODUO\³SXEOLFO\´LV
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response to this is the recognition of the performing rights societies.147
These groups allow one negotiation to occur which results in the
authorized use of large catalogs of protected works. 148 The user of
copyrighted music can be assured that the use of any of the multitude of
works within the catalog will be authorized, including new works
developed after the original negotiation with the performing rights
society was concluded.149
For patents, no system is available to acquire rights to use a patent
by entering into a collective licensing agreement with multiple patent
holders. Although this absence does not affect the licensing of all
patents²a patent that pioneers a new field is particularly appropriate
for one-on-one licensing²for a vast majority of them, it creates a
significant impediment. 150 Specifically, the market value associated
with the license of a patent that claims a minor advancement 151 in a
technological area should be correspondingly small. In reality,
however, the value that can be claimed is greatly enlarged because of
the costs associated with litigating patent rights.152
B. How Mandatory Patent Licenses Would Work
1. Establishing Field Licenses
To implement the proposed system, there would need to be two
classifications for patents. Most patents²likely the ones that add a
minimal amount to the known technology²would be subject to the
defined broadly to include personal or transmitted performances to groups other than
RQH¶VIDPLO\Dnd friends. Id. Consequently, public performances are quite common
DQGDUHVRPHZKDWLQFRQIOLFWZLWKDOD\SHUVRQ¶VXQGHUVWDQGLQJRIZKDWLVDSXEOLF
performance. See Am. Broad. Cos., Inc. v. Aereo, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2498, 2507±10
(2014); Red Baron-Franklin Park, Inc. v. Taito Corp., 883 F.2d 275, 278±79 (4th
Cir. 1989); Columbia Pictures Indus., Inc. v. Redd Horne, Inc., 749 F.2d 154, 158±
59 (3d Cir. 1984).
147
17 U.S.C. § 101 (2012). There is also a strong resemblance with jukeboxes.
See id.
148
See supra Part IV.E.
149
See id. See also Using Copyrighted Music, ASCAP,
http://www.ascap.com/~/media/655449c494b748ba89edc4864655e1b6.pdf (last
visited Mar. 7, 2016).
150
See Christi J. Guerrini, Defining Patent Quality, 82 FORDHAM L. REV. 3091,
3093 (2014).
151
As is well recognized in the literature, many of these patents are, in fact,
invalid because they are either anticipated or obvious. See, e.g., id. at 3092±94;
Wagner, supra note 139, at 2138±39. The cost of licensing a non-patentable
technology should be zero.
152
See supra note 17. For an invalid patent, any licensing fee is presumably
associated with the costs of litigating the invalidity. Cf. id.
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mandatory licensing system. This type of patent will be referred to as a
³ILHOG-OLFHQVHGSDWHQW´ The others that do, in fact, more significantly
advance knowledge, could be excluded from the mandatory licensing
system, thereby requiring an individually negotiated license. These will
EHWHUPHGDVDQ³LQGLYLGXDOO\-OLFHQVHGSDWHQW´
The determination of which license class a patent is placed would
be made by the holder of the patent rights. For the system to be
effective, the decision to choose the individually-licensed class would
have to be at a high enough cost that an holder would be incentivized to
choose an individually-licensed patent only where significant returns
should be expected because of its pioneering nature.
a. Determining Field-License Royalties
For the field-licensed patents, a neutral magistrate153 would define
a royalty rate for all patents within a particular field of technology.
Once the rate for the field is established, a company could buy a license
to use all of the patents within a particular field. In other words, the
PDQGDWRU\OLFHQVHZRXOGDOORZRWKHUVWR³PDNH>@XVH>@RIIHU>@WRVHOO
RUVHOO>@´154 a product that practices anything claimed by a patent within
the field upon payment of the required license fee. The fees collected
for these licenses would be distributed to all who own a field-licensed
patent within the relevant field. As a result, the inventor receives
compensation for the use of the invention²potentially more than would
have been received without this proposed licensing system
functioning 155 ²WKXV VDWLVI\LQJ WKH V\VWHP¶V IXQGDPHQWDO SXUSRVH RI
rewarding inventors for disclosing their inventions 156 while giving
product developers an effective safe harbor against a multitude of patent
claims, whether by patent trolls or by more legitimate companies.
It is important to note that no attempt need be made to determine
that a particular product reads on to a particular patent within the field
or even, for that matter, whether a patent was improperly granted. If the
product practices an art within the field, the mandatory license would
153

This would presumably be an administrative judge operating a system of
adjudication similar to that established in the Copyright Act. See 17 U.S.C. §§ 801±
05 (2012).
154
35 U.S.C. § 271(a) (2012).
155
In fact, most inventors are likely to receive more compensation under this
system than they do now as most patents fail to achieve any financial remuneration.
See Mark A. Lemley & Carl Shapiro, Probabilistic Patents, 19 J. ECON. PERSPS. 75,
   QRWLQJWKDW³>P@RVWLVVXHGSDWHQWVWXUQRXWWRKDYHOLWWOHRUQRFRPPHUFLDO
VLJQLILFDQFH´ 
156
Timothy M. Murphy, Basic Patent Law Issues, BROMBERG & SUNSTEIN LLP,
http://sunsteinlaw.com/media/PatentLawBasics_TM.pdf (last visited Mar. 7, 2016).
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apply and the compensation paid for the field-license would make the
use of any field-licensed patent non-infringing.
7KHUHDUHQXPHURXVZD\VWKDWDSDWHQW¶V³ILHOG´FRXOGEHGHILQHG
for the purpose of mandatory licensing. The easiest approach would be
WRXVHWKHSDWHQWRIILFH¶V³FODVV´GHILQLWLRQV, which GHVLJQDWHDSDWHQW¶V
technological field.157 For some of these classes, however, the Code
covers an immense amount of technology that differs more than the
single class implies. 158 Consequently, if considering the most
commonly patented technologies, the sub-classes defined by the patent
office may be more appropriate.159 In contrast to this, of course, are the
least popular Patent and Trademark OIILFH ³372´ classes where
subdividing beyond the primary class definition would seem to be a
colossally over defined.160 Consequently, it may be more appropriate
to give regulatory authority to the Patent Office to define and potentially
UHGHILQHWKH³ILHOGV´WKDWDUHXVHGIRUPDQGDWRU\OLFHQVLQJ This would
allow the system to be responsive to the different sizes of each patent
class as well as their relative popularity, and would allow the PTO to
keep the system responsive as technology changes.
b. Electing Out of Field-Licensing
Although field-licensing would work better than the current system
for most patents, an exception would be necessary for certain types of
patents. When an inventor creates something in a broad field of
technology²a pioneering invention²field-license compensation
157

See US Classes by Number with Title Menu, U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK
OFF., http://www.uspto.gov/web/patents/classification/selectnumwithtitle.htm (last
modified July 10, 2012, 11:08 AM) (listing the classes defined by the Patent Office)
[hereinafter USPTO Classifications]. The Patent Office has announced that it will be
moving from its traditional class definitions to one established in agreement with the
European Union. See Classification Standards and Development, U.S. PATENT &
TRADEMARK OFF., http://www.uspto.gov/patents-application-process/patentsearch/classification-standards-and-development (last modified Feb. 23, 2016, 3:57
PM). To do a translation between the two systems, see Access Classification
Information by Symbol, U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFF.,
http://www.uspto.gov/web/patents/classification/index.htm (last modified Apr. 16,
2013, 4:31 PM) (cross-referencing system to translate USPTO classes into the new
CPC system and vice versa).
158
See USPTO Classifications, supra note 157 SXVKWKH³JR´EXWWRQQH[WWR
705) (Class 705 Data Processing: Financial, Business Practice, Management, or
Cost/Price Determination has over 100 sub-classifications and is associated with
numerous patents). See also USPTO Patent Counts, supra note 37 (class 054
Harness for Working Animal has far fewer subclasses and accounts for few modern
patent applications).
159
See USPTO Classifications, supra note 157.
160
Id. (noting that only thirteen patents were issued in class 054 in 2014).
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would be an insufficient reward. The patent system has long recognized
that the quantity of the reward provided needs to be dependent on the
scope of the invention, giving a greater reward to the inventor of a more
significant invention.161 Consequently, some way is needed to exempt
a patent from the field-licensing system. Two basic methods are
possible: an attempt can be made to globally define what constitutes a
pioneering invention so that this occurs automatically or, alternatively,
the inventor could be allowed to decide for him or herself that the
invention is a major transformation of existing technology.
The first approach is likely to be extraordinarily difficult to achieve,
as the breadth of technology that is subject to patent is effectively
illimitable, including technological fields that have yet to be
conceived.162 It would indeed be hard, if not impossible, to define what
a pioneering invention is, since this can often only be determined in
hindsight. 163 Additionally, any definitional approach is likely to
introduce significant uncertainty about whether the field-license applies
to a particular patent, thus removing one of the principle justifications
for creating them.164
If the alternate approach of self-definition is taken, the decision to
exclude a patent from the field-licensing system cannot be without cost
to the inventor. After all, if all inventors elect out of the system, the
patent system returns to the status quo and will not gain the benefits
obtained by field-licensing. Consequently, the inventor must pay a cost
to elect out of field-licensing that is expensive enough that the inventor
is expressing a high degree of confidence that more compensation will
be obtained from individually negotiated license fees than would be
earned from field-license royalties. The opt-out system would take
161
See Eibel Process Co. v. Minn. & Ontario Paper Co., 261 U.S. 45, 63 (1923)
³,QDGPLQLVWHULQJWKHSDWHQWODZWKHFRXUWILUVWORRNVLQWRWKHDUWWRILQGZKDWWKH
real merit of the alleged discovery or invention is, and whether it has advanced the
art substantially. If it has done so, then the court is liberal in its construction of the
patent, to secure to the inventor the reward he deserves. If what he has done works
only a slight step forward, and that which he says is a discovery is on the border line
between mere mechanical change and real invention, then his patent, if sustained,
will be given a narrow scope, and infringement will be found only in approximate
FRSLHVRIWKHQHZGHYLFH´ 
162
See Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 309 (1980) (noting that
³DQ\WKLQJXQGHUWKHVXQWKDWLVPDGHE\PDQ´LVSRWHQWLDOO\SDWHQWDEOH 
163
See supra note 114 and accompanying text. A good example demonstrating
this can be found in the early days of electronics. Although Fleming is credited with
inventing the vacuum tube diode having starting his work in 1895, there is strong
evidence that Thomas Edison had practiced one in 1883. Edison failed to appreciate
the value of what he had conceived an abandoned the device. Id.
164
ROBERT GOLDSCHEIDER, LICENSING BEST PRACTICES: THE LESI GUIDE TO
STRATEGIC ISSUES AND CONTEMPORARY REALITIES 129 (2002).
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DGYDQWDJH RI DQ LQYHQWRU¶V DSSUHFLDWLRQ RI WKH ULVNV DVVociated with
obtaining potentially higher compensation against the surety of
obtaining compensation at a lower level.
Of the two approaches, therefore, the second seems more likely to
be effective. Development of a predictive algorithm that could reliably
determine which inventions are pioneering is extraordinarily unlikely.
Just as defining obscenity is problematic,165 determining when a patent
is pioneering is likely to require its effect in the marketplace to be
measured. On the other hand, if it is assumed that inventors as a class
are likely to be rational market actors, their collective decisions about
whether to treat their patents as pioneering will be a relatively
reasonable predictor of that fact.
The second approach is dependent on establishing an appropriate
opt-out fee. The fee forces each inventor to engage in a cost-benefit
analysis with respect to each patent. If the patent remains part of the
field-licensing system, its royalty return will be limited by the modest
rate that is likely to be defined for each field and by the number of
patents that claim inventions within the field.166 On the other hand, a
field-licensed patent holder is effectively guaranteed a royalty return of
some amount unless the field itself is not of interest to any operating
company.167 Similarly, the cost of enforcing patent rights should be
significantly less than the current system as it should be in the economic
interest of most developers of technology to obtain field-licenses in the
fields in which their operations lie.
2. Determining Royalty Rates for Field-Licenses
The hardest aspect of implementing the proposal for field-licenses
would likely be the establishment of an appropriate rate to be paid for
each license. The payment must serve as sufficient compensation to the
group of inventors with a patent in the field so that advancements to the
specific technology represented within the field are properly
165

See -DFREHOOLVY2KLR86   6WHZDUW-FRQFXUULQJ  ³,
shall not today attempt further to define the kinds of material I understand to be
HPEUDFHGZLWKLQ>REVFHQLW\@>E@XW,NQRZLWZKHQ,VHHLW´ 
166
As will be more fully developed, the royalties paid to obtain a field-license
will be split among all holders of a patent within the field. See supra part V.B.1.a.
167
There haYHEHHQQRSDWHQWVILOHGLQWKH³W\SHFDVWLQJ´ILHOG FODVV VLQFH
before 1993. See USPTO Patent Counts, supra note 37. Error! Main Document
Only.As the technology of typecasting is now obsolete and computer generated
typesetting has replaced the old physical technologies, see Mark Collard, The
History of Typesetting, Professional Reports,
http://www.professionalreports.co.uk/the-history-of-typesetting/ (last visited July 27,
2015), no company is likely to obtain a field license covering it.
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incentivized, while costing an amount that will encourage others to
obtain a field-license rather than using the technology in the hopes of
not being sued.
To begin the analysis, it is necessary to carefully articulate exactly
what would be acquired if a field-license were to be purchased. A fieldlicense is, effectively, a license similar to the site licenses used by the
copyright performing rights organizations.168 By having one, its holder
would have the right to practice any invention that has a claim within a
particular field, unless the patent has been properly excluded from the
field-licensing system.169 The practice could be a one-time occurrence±
±to overcome the limitations of the experimental use defense, 170 for
example±±or could be used to distribute millions of products that
practice a covered claim. In each case, the field-license royalty would
be the compensation to which the patent holder is entitled.
As the rate is set, therefore, the typical economic importance of a
non-pioneering patent needs to be determined. Several factors are
important to this analysis; some favor a high royalty rate, while others
suggest otherwise. Ultimately, administrative judges would need to
balance:
Rewarding Inventors: The first and broadest factor favors
establishing a high rate for a field-license. The underlying purpose of
the patent system is to reward inventors for disclosing inventions.171
The holders of a patent have a monopoly granted by the PTO based on
its determination that the statutory requisites have been met. 172
Consequently, as the patentees have disclosed a technology that was not
yet within the prior art, it is important to ensure that the reward provided
is significant enough to serve as a motivation for future inventors to
continue both inventing and disclosing new technology.173
Encouraging More Innovation: The second factor also favors
168

See ASCAP Licensing, supra note 89.
See supra Part V.B.1.
170
See Madey v. Duke Univ., 307 F.3d 1351, 1361±62 (Fed. Cir. 2002).
171
See, e.g.8QLWHG6WDWHVY8QLYLV/HQV&R86   ³7KH
declared purpose of the patent law is to promote the progress of science and the
useful arts by granting to the inventor a limited monopoly, the exercise of which will
HQDEOHKLPWRVHFXUHWKHILQDQFLDOUHZDUGVIRUKLVLQYHQWLRQ´ 
172
See 35 U.S.C. § 101±03 (2012). This paper will not address the underlying
quality problems that have been identified within the U.S. patent system and
assumes that all active patents were granted appropriately and are thus entitled to be
enforced. But see Ralph D. Clifford, Is it Time for a Rule 11 for the Patent Bar?, 53
THE INTELL. PROP. L. REV. 351 (2013); Clifford et al., supra note 6; Guerrini, supra
note 150 and accompanying text.
173
See, e.g., Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470, 480 (1974); Sears,
Roebuck & Co. v. Stiffel Co., 376 U.S. 225, 229±30 (1964); Mitchell v. Tilghman,
86 U.S. 287, 418 (1873).
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setting higher rates. It recognizes that although most new inventions do
not move technology forward in a significant manner, they do represent
an economically valuable improvement to the technology. A good
example of this is the intermittent wiper on automobiles.174 That feature
is not needed to operate an automobile, not even when it is raining. At
the same time, it created a better way of responding to a light rain in an
automobile as is demonstrated by its universal adoption. Further, it was
shown to have considerable economic value before it expired. 175
Royalty rates for field-licenses, therefore, need to be responsive to the
likely economic value of a patent within the field.
Field of Innovation: The third factor²the specific technology
included within the field²could affect the compensation in either
direction. Whatever rates are established need to be sensitive to the
differing economic value that an invention has based on the technology
being developed. A new design for a horse-and-buggy could certainly
qualify for a patent, for example; but it is unlikely to be of any
significant value in modern society. On the other hand, a new
telecommunication invention like Bluetooth176 could be of significant
economic value. Consequently, the rates would need to be set by each
field rather than globally.177
Low Value of Most Patents: Not all factors favor setting a high rate.
In reality, the open-market economic value of many²if not most²
patents is negligible.178 For the non-exceptional patent, the holder never
collects any royalties.179 This fact serves to suggest that a low rate of
field-license royalty would be appropriate and serves to contradict the
other factors that favor higher rates.180 As a consequence of this, rate
setting within a field would need to be sensitive to the number of patents
currently issued in the field and the proportion of them that fail to
achieve any return.
Age of the Patent: The current patent term is twenty years from the
174

U.S. Patent No. 3,351,836 (filed Dec. 1, 1964).
See Kearns v. Chrysler Corp., 32 F.3d 1541, 1544 (Fed. Cir. 1994) (noting
that Ford was ordered to pay $5,163,842 in royalties and upholding a
$18,740,465.43 judgment against Chrysler).
176
See Bluetooth Fact or Fiction, BLUETOOTH,
https://www.bluetooth.com/what-is-bluetooth-technology/bluetooth-fact-or-fiction
(last visited Mar. 7, 2016). See also U.S. Patent No. 6,590,928 (filed Sept. 17, 1997).
177
This re-emphasizes the importance of carefully defining the fields to be used
in the system. See supra Part B.2.
178
See Bronwyn H. Hall, The Use and Value of Patent Rights, U.S. PATENT &
TRADEMARK OFF. (June 2009),
www.uspto.gov/sites/default/files/aia_implementation/ipp-2011nov08-ukipo-2.pdf
³0RVWSDWHQWVDUHZRUWKYHU\OLWWOHDQGDIHZDUHZRUWKDORW´ 
179
See Lemley & Shapiro, supra note 155, at 84.
180
Id. at 75±76, 82, 89, 93, 95.
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application date. 181 For many technologies, however, a patented
invention is not equally valuable throughout its duration. 182 Some
technologies, such as data processing equipment, can become obsolete
quickly. 183 For these types of patents, a higher rate would be
DSSURSULDWH HDUO\LQ WKHSDWHQW¶VH[LVWHQFHEXW ZRXOGEHRIGHFOLQLQJ
value thereafter. For other technologies, often legacy technologies that
are no longer at the leading edge of development,184 lowering the value
with the passage of time would be less appropriate.
Projected Use by the Licensee: The final distinction that the system
should consider is one based on how the licensee is expecting to use the
patents. At one extreme, where a licensee wishes to experiment within
a technological area, either to develop new products or for any reason
that is just more than idle curiosity, 185 but does not intend to widely
practice any patent within the field, a lower fee would seem appropriate.
If, however, patents within the field are likely to be practiced
constantly²through the distribution of products that likely practice one
or more of the patents in the field, for example²a broader and
consequently more expensive license for the technology would be
appropriate.186
181

See 35 U.S.C. § 154(a)(2) (2012) (enumerating a variety of circumstances in
which the duration of a patent will be extended). See also 35 U.S.C. § 154(b) (2012);
id. § 156.
182
See, e.g., Lemley & Shapiro, supra note 155, at 101 n. 96 (citing Pierre
Régibeau & Katharine Rockett, Innovation Cycles and Learning at the Patent
Office: Does the Early Patent Get the Delay?, 58 J. INDUSTRIAL ECON. 222, 222±46
(2010)).
183
See GOPALASWAMY RAMESH & RAMESH BHATTIPROLU, SOFTWARE
MAINTENANCE    QRWLQJWKDWWKHUHLVD³VKULQNLQJOLIHF\FOH>@RI>VRIWZDUH@
WHFKQRORJ>\@´ Cf. Why Your New Smartphone is Already Obsolete, MY PHONE MD
(July 16, 2012), http://myphonemd.net/blog/2012/07/16/why-your-new-smartphoneis-already-obsolete/ (noting that the average life span of a cell phone is less than two
years).
184
See Brien Posey, 10 Obsolete Technologies That Are Still Useful, TECH
REPUBLIC (Sept. 22, 2011, 4:56 AM), http://www.techrepublic.com/blog/10things/10-obsolete-technologies-that-are-still-useful/; Old Technology We Still Use,
INTEL FREE PRESS (Nov. 19, 2013), http://www.intelfreepress.com/news/oldtechnology-we-still-use/7357/.
185
See 0DGH\Y'XNH8QLY)G )HG&LU  ³>7@KH
experimental use defense is very narrow and strictly limited . . . to actions performed
for amusement, to satisfy idle curiosity, or for strictly philosophical inquiry. Further,
use does not qualify for the experimental use defense when it is undertaken in the
guise of scientific inquiry but has definite, cognizable, and not insubstantial
FRPPHUFLDOSXUSRVHV´ internal citations and quotation marks omitted)).
186
By analogy, the scope of a copyright site license would be considerably
cheaper for a small church hall than for a large, commercial concert hall. Compare
Church Licensing Fees, CHRISTIAN COPYRIGHT SOLUTIONS,
https://www.christiancopyrightsolutions.com/purchase-license.aspx?svc=pm (last
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VI. CONCLUSION
Patent law is designed to encourage the transfer of technology from
being solely within the knowledge of an inventor to being part of the
common knowledge of society.187 The main methods by which this is
achieved is by publishing patents with their specifications and by
incentivizing patentees to use or license their inventions. 188 For the
information contained within patents to spread, the information has to
be readily ascertainable by those interested in it.189 The reality of the
modern system, however, fails to achieve this goal because of the
overwhelming number of patents being issued, many of which are of
questionable quality.
The mandatory licensing scheme proposed in this paper is designed
to overcome the failure of the current patent system to achieve its
underlying justification. Rather than using patents in ways that prevent
technology from being transferred, it will ease the flow of technology
from inventors to the public.

visited Mar. 7, 2016) (listing license fees between $199.00 and $2,100.00 per year
depending on church size), with Music Licensing for Venues & Music Clubs, BMI,
http://www.bmi.com/licensing/entry/538740?q=Concert+Venue+Facility (click
³'RZQORDG7KLV/LFHQVH´  ODVWYLVLWHG0DU7, 2016) (showing a license fee starting
at 0.8% of gross ticket revenue per event for for-profit venues).
187
See Margaret McInerney, Tacit Knowledge Transfer with Patent Law:
Exploring Clean Technology Transfers, 21 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT.
L.J. 449, 460 (2011).
188
Id. at 470.
189
See Sean B. Seymore, The Presumption of Patentability, 97 MINN. L. REV.
990, 1018 (2013).

